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I. INTRODUCTION
[T]he petitioners [in Golak Nath's case] left the Court with the
consolation that posterity will enjoy the fruits of the walnut tree
planted by them. But it looks as if a storm is brewing threatening
the very existence of the tree.1
In these words, Mr. Justice Chandrachud described the event of the
phenomenal overruling of the famous Go/ak Nath 2 decision by ten out
of thirteen judges in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala.' These
two cases dealt with the most fundamental issues of constitutional re-
view and stirred much greater controversy in the legal world than even
Alarbury v. Aladison4 did in the past. Alarbury was not unknown to
legal theory because its ultimate source lay in the ancient doctrine of
ultra vires. What made the American Court's assertion of judicial review
unique was the fact that it inferred that power from the structure of the
United States Constitution. In India, judicial review based on the doc-
tfine of ultra vires dates back to the inception of British rule.5 There-
fore, the legitimacy of judicial review has never been an issue. Although
article 13(2) of the Indian Constitution says specifically that a law in-
consistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by part III is void,
the Indian Supreme Court made it clear in one of the earliest cases that
the power of judicial review is inherent in a written constitution and exists
independently of article 13 (2) _6
The Indian Constitution is very specific and detailed; thus the Indian
Supreme Court started with a disadvantage. Considering this disadvan-
tage, it has struggled hard to retain as much judicial review as possible.
Golak Nath and Kesavananda both were assertions of the finality of de-
cision-making power by the Court against Parliament. In this respect
the cases resemble Marbury. But whereas Marbury established the final.
ity of the Court's decisions against Congress, Go/ak Nath and Kesava-
nanda sought to do so against amendment to the constitution. The re-
LL.M., J.S.D. (Northwestern); Reader, Department of Law, University of Bombay.
'Kesavananda Bharadi v. State of Kerala, [1973] 60 All India Rptr. 1461, 2032 (Sup. Ct.).
2 Golak Nath v. State of Punjab [19673 54 All India Rptr. 1643 (Sup. Ct,).
3 [1973] 60 All India Rptr. 1461 (Sup. Ct.).
4 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
5 See The Empress v. Burah and Book Singh, [18783 3 Indian L.R. 63, 87-88 (Calcutta).
8 A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, [1950] 3- All India Rptr. 2', 34 (Sup. Ct.).
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versal of Golak Nath shows that ultimately the finality of judicial deci-
sions cannot be established through legal logic alone.
The Kesavananda case raised questions of crucial importance for the
future of the Indian Constitution as well as Indian democracy. From
the close division among judges on the scope of Parliamentes power of
constitutional amendment as well as judicial review of eminent domain,
two clear alternatives regarding the role of a constitutional court in a
democratic society emerge. The Kesavananda Court was faced with a
difficult choice. On the one hand, it had before it the decision in Golak
Nath, which imposed an embargo on future amendments of the funda-
mental rights, and on the other, it had before it an amendment which
sought to completely eliminate judicial review. The dilemma of the ma-
jority justices was how to concede the power of constitutional amend-
ment to Parliament, which legal logic required them to do, and at the
same time save judicial review. Their decision, although equally vulner-
able from the standpoint of logic as that of Gotak Nath, has to be under-
stood in the light of such a dilemma.
IL BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT
We cannot conclusively say whether the present conflict between
Parliament and the Supreme Court is purely institutional, i.e. arises
from their rival claims for finality of decision-making, or whether it is
ideological. In the course of this article we shall try to answer this ques-
tion, though the question is elusive and any effort to answer it is bound
to produce only a tentative answer.
There was some ambivalence on the part of the drafters of the In-
dian Constitution regarding judicial review. While the drafters included
a declaration of fundamental rights and provided for judicial review,
they also sought to make the constitution detailed and specific with a view
to leaving the minimum of discretion to the judges. Nehru's speech in
the Constituent Assembly that no court would stand in the way of social
reform and that ultimately the constitution itself was a creature of Parlia-
ment showed his distrust of the judges' capacity to adjudicate on social
policy.' The deletion of a "due process" clause was motivated by the de-
sire to avoid the kind of confrontation which the United States had wit-
nessed in the Dred Scott and the New Deal cases between Congress and
the Court.8
However, a written constitution with a bill of righti can hardly ever
See CONSTrTUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES 1195-96.
i See G. AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CoNsTITTmoN: THE CORNEISrONE or A NATiON 84-87
(Oxford Indian Ed. 1972); and 5 B. RAo, FRAMING OF INDIA'S CONSTrTUTIoN 231-38
(1968).
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become so definite and certain as to let the courts function as mere slot
machines. The Indian Supreme Court started its career as a constitution-
al court with an extremely positivist attitude. It held in A. K. Gopalan v.
State of Madras9 that the words "procedure established by law" in article
21 of the constitution10 meant the procedure prescribed by an enacted
law. The Court refused to extend the protection of the rules of natural
justice to a person detained under the law of preventive detention."
This initial diffidence, however, was soon abandoned and the Court ac-
knowledged in a later case that although it did not act "to tilt at legisla-
tive authority in a crusader's spirit," its constitutional role was that of the
"sentinel on the 'qui vive'" as to the fundamental rights.12 Mr. Chief
Justice Patanjali Sastri observed that it was "inevitable that the social
philosophy and the scale of values of the [judges participating in the
decision should play an important part" in constitutional decision-making
but warned that the judges must exercise the power of judicial review
with restraint.3 Later, the Court was to deal with complex social ques-
tions such as: can fundamental rights be waived; 14 can there be a total
ban on the slaughter of cows;15 can a state university change the medium
of instruction from English to a regional language;16 how much protec-
tive discrimination for backward sections of people is valid and how
should it be reconciled with the guarantee of equal protection of laws."1
It is only on the right to property guaranteed by article 31 of the con-
stitution s that the Court and Parliament came to adopt entirely contra-
dictory positions. Most of the amendments to the Indian Constitution
which restricted fundamental rights curbed property rights, and most of
them were aimed at rejecting the judicial interpretation given by the
Court. In the original constitution itself, the land reform legislation had
been excluded from the protection of article 31.19 But when the Patna
High Court invalidated such legislation on the ground that it violated the
9 [1950) 37 All India Rptr. 27 (Sup. Cr.).
10 COmNSTTION oF INDIA, art. 21: "No person shall be deprived of his life or personal
liberty except according to procedure established by law."
11 For a criticism of this decision, see E. MCWHINNEY, JUDICIAL RvEnIw 132-36 (2d ed.
i969).
12 State of Madras v. V. G. Row, [1952] 39 All India Rptr. 196, 199 (Sup. Ct.).
18Id. at 200.
14 Basheshar Nath v. Commissioner of Income Tax, [1959] 46 All India Rptr. 149 (Sup.
CO.
15M. H. Quareshi v. State of Bihar, [1958] 45 All India Rptr. 731 (Sup. Ct.).
16 Gujarat University v. Shri Krishna, [1963] 50 All India Rptr. 703 (Sup. Ct).
17 M. J. Balaji v. State of Mysore, [1963] 50 All India Rptr. 649 (Sup. Ct.).
Is See Appendix, infra, at 895.
1 9CONs~rrJO ON op INDIA, art. 31, clauses (4) and (6).
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right to equality, 0 the first amendment was enacted to bring two new
articles, 31-A and 31-B, into the constitution. These articles extended
the immunity of social reform legislation against other fundamental rights
also. The scope of these articles was expanded by the subsequent amend.
ments.21
In Subodh Gopal2 and Dwarkadas,03 the Supreme Court interpreted
article 31 in such a way that compensation became payable even when
a person was deprived of his property by the exercise of the state's police
power. Both decisions were given by a majority of four against one.
Mr. Justice S. R. Das (who later became the Chief Justice), in his dis-
senting judgment, held that the liability to pay compensation arose only
when property was acquired by the state. In other words, he would
have restricted the liability to the cases of eminent domain only. In
Bella Baneree,2' the Court held unanimously that the word "compensa-
tion" meant the just equivalent of the value of property. According to
the Court, the market value was the essential criterion of compensation.
These decisions were overturned by the fourth amendment which made
it explicit that compensation need be paid only when property was trans-
ferred to the state and that the adequacy of compensation was not justici-
able.2 5
The express words of the constitution prevented the Court from re-
viewing compensation. The Court acquiesced in this in the beginning."-
But in Vajravelu,27 a five judge bench led by Chief Justice Subba Rao
held that even after the fourth amendment the Court had the power to
review compensation or the principles for fixing compensation with a
view to ensuring that it was the just equivalent of the value of property.
Since Parliament had used the word "compensation" even after the
enactment of the fourth amendment, it had approved the meaning which
the Court gave to it in Bella Banerjee. On this basis the Court said that
while the adequacy could not be reviewed, the relevancy of the principles
of compensation could be reviewed. The question remains: relevancy to
2 0 Karneshwar Singh v. State of Bihar, [1951] 38 All India Rptr. 91 (Patna).
2 1 CONSnT'TON OF INDIA, art. 31-B, states that the ac and regulations specified in
schedule nine shall not be void on the ground that they are inconsistent with the fundamental
rights.
22 State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal, (1954] 41 All India Rptr. 92 (Sup. Cc.).
2 3 Dwarkadas v. Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co., [1954] 41 All India Rptr. 119 (Sup.
Ct.). For a critique of these two cases, ice P. TRIPATHI, SOME INSIGHTS INTO FUNDA-
MENTAL RIGHTS, Lecture IV 211-60 (University of Bombay 1972).
24 State of West Bengal v. Bella Banerjee, [1954] 41 All India Rptr. 170 (Sup. CL).
15 See Appendix, infra, at 896.
26 Burrakur Coal Co. v. Union of India, [1961] 48 All India Rptr. 954 (Sup. Ct).
2 T Vajraveu v. Special Duty Collector, [1963] 52 All India Rptr. 1017 (Sup. C).
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what? Such relevancy could be determined only in terms of the market
value. Therefore, it was impossible to review the relevancy without re-
viewing the adequacy. The Court probably was content to restrict its
intervention to cases of gross abuse of power by the legislature. Even in
the Constituent Assembly Nehru had conceded that the courts could inter-
vene in the matter of compensation when it was illusory.28 The Court's
verdict therefore might have reinstated judicial review partially. How-
ever, the line dividing "illusory" from "inadequate" is so thin that either
the Court may not intervene at all and thus may totally abdicate its au-
thority or it may intervene too often. In Vajravelu, the Court did not
strike down the law on the ground of compensation. It chose to strike
it down on the ground that it was discriminatory, since it paid less com-
pensation than was payable under another similar statute which coexisted
with it.
In subsequent cases, the Court struck down the laws in the Metal
Corporation2' and Bank Nationalisation" cases. In both cases one could
not say that the compensation was illusory although it was definitely in-
adequate. Thus the Court had almost nullified the fourth amendment,
Only once between the Metal Corporation and Bank Nationalisalion cases,
in Shantilal,31 the Court held that the compensation was absolutely un.
reviewable. In fact, the need for judicial intervention was greater in
Shantilal than in the other two cases because this was a clear case of il-
lusory compensation. Here, for a property which was acquired under
the Bombay Town Planning Act in 1965, compensation was given at the
rate of its market value in 1942. The Court could have struck down the
executive action alone and thus prevented this unjust result. But the de-
cision virtually "constitutionalizes confiscation." ' ' Shanti/al showed the
ambivalence of the judicial attitude on the question of compensation.
Such ambivalence is also to be seen in the observation of Mr. Justice
Hidayatullah in Golak Nath, that among all of the fundamental rights,
the right to property was the weakest." Nevertheless, in all of the above
decisions, the judges on the whole leaned heavily in favour of judicial
review of compensation.
As a result of the judicial favoritism of compensation, the Supreme
Court is often accused of having espoused the property rights at the cost
289 CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES 1193.
29 Union of India v. Metal Corp. of India, (196 7 54 All India Rpm 637 (Sup. C
3 O Cooper v. Union of India, [19701 57 All India Rptr. 564 (Sup. Ct.).
31 State of Gujarat v. Shantilal, [1969) 56 All India Rptr. 634 (Sup. Ct.).
32 Baxi, State of Gujarat t'. Shantilal: A Requiem for "Ju i Cwt,, /- ,i. at.," 9 JAIlI IT
UJ. 29, 32 (1969).
33 [1967] 54 All India Rptr. 1643, 1710 (Sup. Ct.).
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of social justice. But there appears to be an inner contradiction in the
constitution itself. If the constitution-makers did not want reviewability
of compensation, the best course for them would have been to provide
only the guarantee in clause (1) of article 31, which states that a person
should not be deprived of property without the authority of law. Why
did they provide the guarantee of compensation in clause (2) at all?
If compensation is to be given, it has to be adequate and just. But what
is adequate compensation? Adequate for whom? If we say that it should
be adequate according to the owner, then even the market value may
not always be adequate. Seervai defines market value as the price a free
willing buyer is prepared to offer to a free willing seller.3 ' But does not
the concept of eminent domain exclude there being a free willing seller?
Because, according to it, the state does not decide to acquire property
with the consent of the property owner. It is a compulsory sale. This
element of compulsion may make even the market value prevailing at a
time inadequate. When the state acquires property, it must pay compen-
sation which is adequate at that time, independently of whether the owner
of the property considers it to be adequate. Such adequacy will have to
be determined in the light of a variety of social and economic factors
- the capacity of the state to pay being one of them. But the policy of
acquisition must be overall and uniform. If in each case the legislature
determines compensation according to different sets of principles, injus-
tice may result. Shantilal exposes the injustice and contradiction very
tellingly. At the same time Bank shows how excessive reliance by the
judiciary on standards derived from a free market economy may impose a
heavy burden on society. These two cases illustrate how the illusory
compensation test can result in either abdication of judicial review or
over-exercise of it.
III. A ENDABILITY OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS:
1950 TO 1967
The above analysis suggests that Parliament had succeeded in over-
riding the decisions of the Court by amending the constitution. Article
368 of the constitution provides for its amendment. A bill for amend-
ment can be passed with the support of two thirds of the members pres-
ent and voting and an absolute majority of the total membership of each
House of Parliament. In respect of certain articles of the Constitution
which have been enumerated in the proviso, an amendment is further
required to be ratified by not less than half the state legislatures, after it is
passed by Parliament in the above manner. After it is so passed and rati-
:'4 H. Seervai, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw oF INDIA 559 (1968).
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fled as required, it is presented to the President for his assent, and upon
obtaining such assent, the constitution stands "amended in accordance
with the terms of the bill."35
Having lost hope that the Court would protect private property, the
property owners tried to attack the power of amendment itself. This
was done first in 1951 in Shankari Prasad0 and again in 1965 in Sajjan
Singh. It was contended that an amendment was "law" for the purpose
of article 13(2), which says that the state shall not make any law which
may take away or abridge the fundamental rights. Hence an amend-
ment of the Constitution which abridged or took away the fundamental
rights was void. In Shankari Prasad the validity of the first amendment,
and in Sajjan Singh the validity of the seventeenth amendment, were
challenged. Both times this contention was rejected on the ground that
there was distinction between ordinary law and constitutional law and
that article 13(2) covered only the former. In Shankari Prasad the de-
cision was unanimous of a bench of five judges, whereas in Sajjan Singh
this view was taken by three judges against two.
In Golak Nath v. State of Punjab,38 the Court held by a majority of
six to five that Parliament could not amend the constitution so as to take
away or abridge the fundamental rights. The majority justices held that
the word "law" in article 13(2) included a constitutional amendment
and hence a constitutional amendment inconsistent with it would be
void.
The strong support of the majority justices in Golak Nath for reinstat-
ing judicial review of compensation in the property cases, despite the
fourth amendment, shows that they were looking at Golak Nath as a
shield against further erosion of fundamental rights, including the right
to property. The process of stopping the future amendments and reading
down the existing amendments seems to have a common policy thread.
Those judges who conceded unlimited power of constitutional amend-
ment but held in favour of greater judicial review of eminent domain
were perhaps more traditional in their approach to constitutional inter-
pretation. There does not seem to be any policy difference in these two
sets of judges. Only their conceptions of judicial role were different.
The Golak Nath majority justices were pragmatic. They realised that
any reinterpretation of the relation between articles 13(2) and 368 might
require them to strike down the previous constitutional amendments.
35 CONSTIuON oF INDIA, art. 368 (as originally enacted). See Appendix, Infra, at
898.
3G Shankari Prasad v. Union of India, [1951] 38 All India Rptr. 458 (Sup. Ct.).
37 Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (1965] 52 All India Rptr. 845 (Sup. Ct.).
38 (1967] 54 All India Rptr. 1643 (Sup. C.).
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They did not want to wipe out these amendments since they were the
source of so much social reconstruction that had taken place. There-
fore, Chief Justice Subba Rao applied the doctrine of prospective over-
ruling and Mr. Justice Hidayatullah applied the theory of social acquies-
cence to let these amendments continue as valid laws even after the de-
cision.
The Golak Nath decision came at a time when the Congress Party
had lost its old position of dominance. It held a very slender and shaky
majority in Parliament and had lost the majority in more than half of the
state legislatures after the fourth general election. The decision came a
few days before the election results. Therefore, the amendment of the
constitution having become politically difficult, Golak Nath came to have
a finality."9 Although the late Mr. Nath Pai, a Socialist M.P., introduced
a bill to amend the constitution so as to restore to Parliament the power
of constitutional amendment, this bill did not make much headway.4
After Golak Nath, within a few days, Chief Justice Subba Rao resigned
to become the opposition's candidate for the presidential election. This
was a departure from the past tradition of judges' total insulation from
politics and Subba Rao was severely criticised,41 and he later lost the
election. Later in his public lectures he defended the Golak Nath deci-
sion.4" Subba Rao had exploded the myth of a neutralist and apolitical
judge.43 We are reminded of the following observations of Cardozo:
The great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men do not turn
aside in their course and pass the judges by.44
39 See S. SATHE, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND AMENDMENT OF THE INDIAN CONS'fl-
tunoN 61 (1968).
40 See the author's comments on this bill in ANNUAL SURvEy OF INDIAN LAW 10-12
(1968); and in Amendability of Fundamental Rights: Golak Nath and the Proposed Comi-
tutional Amendment, 1 SUP. CT. J. 33 (1969).
41 See IL SEERVA, THE POSITION OF THE JUDICIARY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDIA, 121-22 (1970). According to Seervai, the constitution should be amended to prevent
any judge from seeking or obtaining political office. Mr. Seervai was the Advocate General
of Maharashtra and apart from being a leading lawyer is a jurist of international fame. His
treatise, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, is a classic on the Indian Constitution and can be
compared with the very best books on constitutional law.
42 See K. RAO, SOME CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS (1970).
4 3 See Gadbois, Indian Supreme Court Justices: A Portrait, 3 LAW AND SodY REV. 317
(1969), who notes that "a prototype judge ... refrained from participation in a nationalist
movement before 1947 and in post-independence politics thereafter." The neutralist image of
the judge was also shaken in the recent controversy over the appointment of Mr. Justice A. N.
Ray as Chief Justice in preference to three senior judges. See generally KUMAItMANGALAM,
JUDIcIAL APPOINTMENTS (1973); ANTULAY, APPOINTMENT OF A CHIEF JUSTICE (1973);
HEDGE, CRISIS IN INDIAN JUDICIARY (1973); and PALKHIVALA, A JUDICIARY MADE 70
MEASURE (1973).
44 B. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDIcIAL PRocESS 168 (1932).
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IV. PARLIAMENT AMENDS THE CONSTITUTION
After the Bank and Privy Purse4' decisions of the Supreme Court,
both of which went against the government, the tension between Parlia-
ment and the Court mounted. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi requested
the President to dissolve the House and hold mid-term elections. In the
Congress Party manifesto it was stated that the party intended to make
basic changes in the Constitution.4 The party won a landslide victory
at the election and secured two-thirds of the total number of seats, much
more than the number that is required for bringing about an amendment
of the constitution. The functional finality of Golak Nath could not be
sustained against such a majority in the new Lok Sabha (the lower house).
The government introduced the twenty-fourth constitutional amend-
ment on July 28, 1971. Mr. H. R. Gokhale, Minister of Law and Justice
told the Lok Sabha that the bill "again asserts" that Parliament is su-
preme.47 He said they were "under a clear mandate, a massive mandate,
from the people" for bringing these amendments "so as to remove the
impediments that have been created in the way of the implementation of
the fulfilment of our socio-economic programmes."4 8 He said that Golak
Nath gave prominence to the static element of the constitution at the
45 Madhav Rao Scindia v. Union of India, [1971] 58 All India Rptr. 530 (Sup. Ct.). The
President issued an order withdrawing the recognition of the rulers of the erstwhile princely
states. This was done in pursuit of the Congress Party's policy of abolishing the privy purses
and princely privileges. An amnndinent o. the constitution to that effect had failed to obtain
the support of the required majority. Under clause (22) of article 366 of the constitution,
a ruler means the prince, chief or other perton by whom any ,ovenant or agreement as is
referred to in clause (1) of article 291 was entered into and who for the time being is reco
ognised by the President as the ruler of the state. If a peron is not recognised by the Presi.
dent, he automatically loses the rights to a privy purse and the privileges. The President
therefore issued an order derecognising the princes. The Supreme Court held by a majority
of nine against two that the above order was unconstitutional. Mr. Justice Mitter held that
the Court had no jurisdiction and Mr. Justice Ray upheld the government's action. It is
significant that Justices Shah, Sikri, Shelat, Vaidialingar and Hidayatullah who voted with
the majority were also with the majority in Golak Nat. Justice Bhargava had voted for
the amendability of fundamental rights. This (ase has not been induded in the above anal.
ysis because it technically does not fall within the subject with which the other cases were
concerned. But it is interesting that five out of six judges of the Golak Nath majority voted
against the government in this care. Only one judge, Subba Rao, did not vote because he had
retired. As against this, only one judge, Mr. Justice Bhargava. of the minority justices in
Golak Nath voted against the government. Then it is interesting that eight judges were com-
mon to the Bank and Privy cases. Out of these, four participated in Kesavana and all of them
voted for the limited amendability of the constitution.
See generally Imam, The Privy Purse Cat: A Critique, 13 J. INDIAN LAW INST. 385
(1971); and Roberts, The Supreme Court in a Developing Souci): Progressive or Rwirtionary
Force? A Study ot the Privy Purse Case in India, 20 AM. J. COMP. L. 79 (1972).
46See S. K. TAMBERI, THE WONDER ELECTION 1971: INDIRA VERSUS Till3 RIGHT 94
(1971).
47 7 LOK SABHA DEBATES, No. 53, at col. 146 (5th Series, August 1, 1971).
48 Id.
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cost of its dynamic element embodied in the directive principles of state
policy.49
The late Mr. Kumaramangalam (Minister of Steel and Mines) said
that the philosophy underlying Golak Nath was of distrust of the legis-
lature.50 He described the Supreme Court as an "undemocratic collection
of very respected gentlemen."' He taunted the opposition parties like
Jan Sangh and Swatantra, which were not openly opposing the bill but
were doing so indirectly. He said if they stood by Golak Nath they
would lose the support of the people, and if they opposed it those who
supported might desert them.s-
Mr. A. K. Gopalan (Communist Party-Marxist) said that "hin-
drances ...from the High Courts and the Supreme Court, would be
removed"' 3 by the passing of this bill. Mr. R. K. Sinha (Congress) said
that Golak Nath was an attempt to take away the sovereignty of the
Indian people.54  Indrajit Gupta (Communist Party of India) said the
Supreme Court had been oblivious to the directive principles of state pol-
icy. 5 Chandrajit Yadav (Congress) said that Golak Nath had stopped
the nation's progress.5 6 Mr. Amrit Nahata (Congress) said that Golak
Nath was a political judgment T  Professor Madhu Dandavate (Social)
said that the Court had become the third chamber of the Parliament 8
Mr. Sant Bux Singh (Congress) asked, "[is) this country going to take
up a position where the judges of the Supreme Court will not only inter-
pret but make the law ?"5' Mr. Shamin (Congress) said that the Supreme
Court judges were not infallible."'
Mr. Gopalan pointed out that the Court had upheld restrictions on
personal liberty but not on the property rights. He himself had been the
victim of the Supreme Court's interpretation where it held that the legis-
lature's power to curb personal liberty was unrestricted."' In Bank the
"class character of the judges came out."' - Mr. Kumaramangalam said:
49 Id. at Col. 151.
50 7 LOK SABHA DEBATEs, No. 54, at col. 218 (5th series, August 14, 1971).
51 Id. at col. 233.
52 Id. at coL 229.
53 7 LIOX SABHA DEBATES, No. 53, at col. 158 (5th series, August 3, 1974).
5.4 Id. at col. 164.
55 Id. at col. 174.
56 Id. at col. 194.
57 Id. at col. 215.
58 Id. at col. 239.
59 Id. at col. 263.
,n Id. at col. 269.
6 1 A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, [19501 37 All India Rptr. 27 (Sup. Ct.).
62 7 LOK SABHA DEBATES, No. 53, at col. 160 (5th series, August 3, 1971).
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We respect our judges. But, we recognise them as men,-men as frail
as we are, as prone to commit error, as prone to do good and also bad,
as all of us, ... with an inbuilt conservatism born out of the class from
which they come.63
Mr. Sreekantan Nair (C.P.M.) said that the judges came from "the higher
strata of society and are isolated from the hopes and aspirations of the
common man of today by the gulf of two generations."0 4 He therefore
predicted that Parliament would have further opposition from the Su-
preme Court. He wanted the retirement age of the judges to be lowered
so that younger men could be appointed as judges. 5
A strong support for judicial review came from an independent mem-
ber, who was formerly India's defense minister, the late V. K. Krishna
Menon. He said that so long as there was a constitution, somebody had
to interpret it and this could best be done by the Supreme Court."
Nevertheless, he supported the amendment.
Opposition to the bill came from Jan Sangh and Swatantra, India's
rightist parties and some other independent members. Mr. Atal Bihari
Bajpai, the Jan Sangh leader, said that the Supreme Court's opinion
might be obtained upon the proposed act. This would avoid confronta-
tion. He did not admit that Parliament was supreme in every matter.
He asked whether Parliament could change democracy into autocracy or
could it abolish secularism and set up a theocratic state. He was afraid
that the proposed bill would not only abridge the right to property but
that all other fundamental rights would be in danger of extinction. 7 Mr.
Frank Anthony, a nominated member representing the Anglo-Indian
community, said that not Parliament but the constitution was supreme.08
He deplored attacks on judges and their decisions. Mr. H. M. Patel
(Swatantra) said that as long as Golak Nath stood, the bill could not be
passed. He denied that the Court came in the way of progress. He said
that if unrestricted power were given to Parliament, it might be abused."0
Various amendments to the bill were proposed. Some amendments
sought to make constitutional amendment more difficult. For example,
K. Manoharan (D.M.K.) wanted an amendment of fundamental rights
to be ratified by not less than 75 percent of the state legislatures, 0 where-
63Id. No. 54, at col. 221-22 (5th series, August 4, 1971).
64 Id. at col. 246.
65 Id.
6Old. at col. 238.
67 7 LOK SABHA DEBATES, No. 53, at col. 193 (4th series, August 3, 1971).
68 d. at coL 207.
O9 Id. at col. 220.
707 LO.K SABHA DEBATES, No. 54, at col. 337 (5th series, August 3, 1971), The
D.M.K. is a regional party in the State of Tamil Nadu (Madras).
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as Mr. Shamim suggested ratification by half the state legislatures."' These
amendments were rejected. There were amendments suggesting that the
advisory opinion of the Supreme Court be obtained or the bill be sent
for an opinion poll. These latter amendments were also defeated.
Various members tabled amendments seeking to exclude certain fun-
damental rights from the process of constitutional amendment. Mr.
Gopalan wanted the rights of freedom of speech and expression, freedom
of assembly and association, and freedom of movement to be protected.7 2
Mr. Frank Anthony wanted the rights of the religious institutions as well
as of the minorities to be protected; 7 on the other hand, there were
amendments for excluding the rights of equality, the provision against
untouchability, personal freedoms, religious freedom, and the rights of
the minorities from the process of amendment. 4 All these amendments
were rejected. The twenty-fourth amendment was passed by the Lok
Sabha by a vote of 384 to 23.75
In the Rajya Sabha (the upper house), the bill was passed by a vote
of 177 to 8.7 Here also several amendments were proposed to exclude
certain freedoms from the process of constitutional amendment. Mr.
Nageshwara Prasad Sahi wanted the power of constitutional amendment
to be confined only to the right to property.7 7 Mr. Abdulla Koya wanted
the rights of equality, against untouchability, of personal freedoms, of re-
ligious freedom, and of the minorities to be excluded. 8 Both were re-
jected. Mr. Rajnarain of the Socialist Party wanted all the rights guaran-
teed by article 19 except the right to hold, acquire, and dispose of
property to be made unamendable 9 Mr. N. G. Goray (Socialist) wanted
the rights of freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of associa-
tion, and right to equality to be excepted.8° All of these amendments
were defeated."'
The Constitution (Twenty-fourth) Amendment Act, 1971, made the
following changes: (1) in article 13, an additional clause was added
which made it explicit that nothing in the article shall apply to any
amendment of the constitution made under article 368; (2) the title of
71'd
72 Id. at coL 335.
73Id. at col 319.
74 Id. at col. 327.
75Id. at coL 425.
76 67 PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, RAJYA SABHA, at col. 312 (August 11, 1971).
771d. at 240.
781d. at col. 241.
791d. at cOL 253.
80 Id. at coL 254.
81d at coL 281.
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part XX of the constitution which formerly read as "Procedure for the
amendmefit of the Constitution" was now changed to "Power of Parlia-
ment to amend the Constitution and Procedure therefor;" (3) in clause
(1) of article 368 the words "Notwithstanding anything in this Consti-
tution" were added and it was made clear that an amendment by Parlia-
ment of the constitution was made in "exercise of its constituent power."
Further, instead of the word "amendment," the words "amend by way of
addition, variation or repeal" were added, so as to provide maximum pos-
sible scope for constitutional amendment; (4) in clause (2) of article
368 the giving of assent was made obligatory upon the President; and
(5) it was made clear that nothing in article 13 shall apply to any amend-
ment of the constitution. These changes were made with a view to over-
coming the objections raised by the Golak Nath majority justices. Items
(1) and (5) were intended to get over the objection raised by the Go/ak
Nath majority justices that an amendment of the constitution was con-
trolled by article 13(2). Item (3) was provided with a view to avoiding
any other interpretation leading to a limited scope of the power of amend-
ment. Item (2) 'aimed at dispelling Chief Justice Subba Rao's view that
article 368 as originally enacted did not contain the power of amend-
ment but contained only the procedure. In Golak Nath, the majority
justices had found that the two processes, that of constitutional amend-
ment and ordinary legislation, were identical. From this they had fur-
ther buttressed their view that there was no difference between ordinary
law and a constitutional amendment. By dispensing with the President's
assent this distinction was made explicit. Item (4) aimed at accomplish-
ing this."
The Constitution (Twenty-fifth) Amendment Bill was introduced in
the Lok Sabha on July 28, 1970. It came for discussion on November
30, 1971. This amendment sought to get over the objections which the
Supreme Court had raised in Bank. It replaced the word "compensation"
in clause (2) of article 31 by the word "amount." The Court had inter-
preted the word "eompensation" to mean the just equivalent of value of
the property acquired. The non-normative word "amount," it was hoped,
would free the government of any such obligation."' The amendment
made two further changes. First it said that article 19(1) (f) would
not apply to the cases of eminent domain covered by article 31(2). Be-
fore Bank, the Supreme Court had held that the two articles were mu.
tually exclusive. 4 Since in Bank the Court made article 19(1) (f) ap-
82 CONSTITrUTION OF INDIA, art. 368 (as amended).
83 Id., art. 31 (2). See Appendix, in!ra, at 896.
84 H. M. SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 396, n.50 (1968).
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plicable to acquisition of property by the state under article 31(2), the
above amendment became necessary.85 Lastly, Parliament added one
more article to the constitution. This article, 31-C, conferred immunity
on laws enacted for giving effect to the directive principles of state policy
embodied in clauses (b) and (c) of article 39 against invalidity arising
from their contravention of the fundamental rights of equality, personal
freedoms and the right to property.86
Mr. Gokhale, the Law Minister, said that after the amendment it
would not be possible for the Court to block the measures of social change
by compelling the government to pay a heavy compensation. On the
agenda there was "a far-reaching programme aimed at restructuring the
entire socioeconomic fabric of our country."8-s Determination of com-
pensation had been made non-justiciable so that the judges could be kept
outside of the political arena."" Mr. Kumaramangalam pointed out that
nowhere in the world did democracy require by definition that property
could be taken away only at the payment of market value.8s He pointed
out that there was no intention to harm the small property owners or the
minorities.0° The word "amount" meant "whatever amount that is con-
sidered reasonable and proper by Parliament."'" Mr. Gokhale clarified
in the end once again that the amendment did not make the payment of
compensation equal to the full market value impossible. It only gave
freedom to Parliament to fix the compensation in the light of factors
such as how much profit it had already yielded to the owner, whether it
was large or small, and whether it was a means of production. 2 Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi said that social investment which enhanced the
value of a property could not be ignored while computing the compen-
sation. 3
Mr. Samar Mukherjee (C.P.M.) said that the constitution should be
changed lock, stock and barrel. 94 In his opinion there should be no com-
pensation at all for foreign or local monopolist capitalists." Mr. Krishna
85 The Constitution (Twenty-fifth) Amendment Act added clause 2(B). See Appendix,
infra, at 896.
86 CoNsTrrUnoN oF INDA, art. 31-c. See also text of artide 39(b) and (c) in Appendix,
infra, at 898.
87 9 LOK SABHRA DEBATES, No. 12, at col. 222 (5th series, November 30, 1971).
88d at col. 225.
89 Id. at col. 306.
9Old. at col. 311.
VlId. at col. 313.
92 Id., No. 13, at col. 409 (5th series, December 1, 1971).
M Id. at cols. 345-46.
94 9 LoK SABHA DEBATEs, No. 12, at col. 233 (5th series, November 30, 1971).
95 Id. at coL 234.
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Menon was not sure that by the insertion of the word "amount" the gov-
ernment would be able to escape the Court's objections." Mr. Samar
Guha (Socialist) said that there must exist some criteria for compensa-
tion, and the function of "keeping an eye to the criterion" must be en-
trusted to the Court.9 7
Dealing with article 31-C, Mr. Gokhale pointed out that the Supreme
Court had in the past used the right of freedom of speech to invalidate
laws which aimed at eliminating the monopolies in press ownership."8
Therefore the government could not accept the Law Commission's rec-
ommendation to confine the immunity only against the property rights.
Regarding the finality clause, Mr. Gokhale said that: the courts would even
then have the power to object to colourable legislation, because they
could examine whether there was a nexus between a law and the direc-
tive principles. It was not fair to the courts to ask them to review wheth-
er a law gave effect to those directive principles because that was essen-
tially a political question."9
Mr. Frank Anthony described the provision as "monstrous." Ac-
cording to him "it subverts the whole basic fundamental character of the
Constitution."' 100 Mr. Piloo Modi criticised the government for promot-
ing monopolies and concentration of wealth through its wrong licensing
policies and half-hearted fiscal efforts. 1' 1
A number of amendments were proposed to the bill.10 2 All were
rejected. The government moved an amendment whereby it was stated
that no property belonging to an educational institution of a minority
shall be acquired without paying an amount which would be determined
with due regard to the cultural and educational rights of the minorities
guaranteed by article 30.103 This was passed.
The Constitution (Twenty-fifth) Amendment Act, was passed in the
Lok Sabha by a vote of 353 to 20. 4 In the Rajya Sabha, it was passed
by a vote of 166 to 20.105
96 Id., No. 13, at col. 409 (5th series, December 1, 1971).
97Id. at col. 323.
989 Lo: SABHA DEBATES, No. 12, at col. 228 (5th series, November 30, 1971).
99Id. at col. 229.
100 6 LoK SABHA DEBATES, No. 48, at col. 299 (5th series, July 28, 1971).
1019 LoK SABHA DEBATES, No. 12, at cols. 278-79 (5th serie.;, November 30, 1971).
102 One proposed amendment was for circulating the bill among the public to elicit opin-
ion. This amendment was defeated. Id., No. 13, at col. 366 (5th series, December 1, 1971).
Another proposed amendment was to send the bill to the supreme court for an advisory opin.
ion. This amendment was also defeated. Id.
108Id. at col. 381.
104 d. at col. 523.




Parliament then passed the Constitution (Twenty-ninth) Amend-
ment Act, which conferred immunity on two laws of the Kerala state
against challenge on the ground of their inconsistency with any of the fun-
damental rights by including them in the Ninth Schedule.106
V. KESAVANANDA BHARTAI-BACK TO THE COURT
Under one of the Kerala Acts, the properties of His Holiness, Kesa-
vananda Bharati, were to be acquired by the state. The petitioner had
moved the Supreme Court under article 32 of the constitutionI07 against
one of these acts. By the Constitution (Twenty-ninth) Amendment Act,
the act against which the above petition was pending was included in the
Ninth Schedule. This prevented the petitioner from challenging its
constitutionality. The petitioner therefore challenged the validity of the
constitutional amendment itself. However, in order to challenge its va-
lidity, he had to attack the twenty-fourth amendment. Some other peti-
tioners also joined him and they attacked the twenty-fifth amendment.
All of these petitions came together for hearing before the largest bench
of the Supreme Court, consisting of thirteen judges, in Kesavananda
Bharati v. State of Kerala.'08
The issues which the Court was called upon to decide were mainly
the following: (1) was Golak Nath rightly decided; (2) were there any
limits to Parliament's power of constitutional amendment; and (3) were
the impugned constitutional amendments valid.
A. Was Golak Nath rightly decided?
Ten out of thirteen judges who heard the case held that Golak Nath
had been wrongly decided. Only Chief Justice Sikri and Mr. Justice
Shelat, who wrote a judgment on behalf of himself and Mr. Justice
Grover, did not give any conclusive opinion. According to Chief Justice
Sikri, it was not necessary to decide whether Golak Nath was rightly de-
cided, because the real issue was the extent of the amending power con-
ferred by article 368.1"9 Mr. Justice Shelat observed that the Golak Nath
decision had become academic "because even on the assumption that the
majority decision in that case was not correct, the result on the questions
now raised ... would just be the same.""10 These judges were parties to
Io.' See CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, article 31-B, in Appendix, infra at 898.
107 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, art. 32, guarantees the right to move the supreme court for
the enforcement of fundamemal rights.
108 [1973] 60 All India Rptr. 1461 (Sup. Ct.).
109Id. at 1489.
110 Id. at 1566.
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the Golak Nath majority decision and therefore their avoidance of this
question can be well appreciated.11 All the other judges held that there
was a distinction between constitutional law and ordinary law and that
since an amendment of the constitution was constitutional law, it could
not come within the scope of article 13 (2).
B. Scope of Parliament's Power of Constitutional Amendment
The petitioners as well as the respondents presented their sides with
arguments which had political overtones. For example Mr. Chief Justice
Sikri, while summarising the contentions of both sides, said:
The respondents claim that Parliament can abrogate fundamental rights
such as freedom of speech and expression, freedom to form associations
or unions and freedom of religion. They claim that democracy can even
be replaced and one-party rule established. Indeed, short of repeal of
the Constitution, any form of Government with no freedom to the citi-
zens can be set up by Parliament by exercising its powers under article
368.113
Similarly, Mr. Justice Shelat, who wrote a judgment on behalf of himself
and Mr. Justice Grover stated in the beginning that "the respective posi-
tions adopted by learned counsel for the parties diverge widely and are ir-
reconciliable." Then while stating the position of the respondents, Mr.
Justice Shelat said:
The respondents, on the other hand, claim an unlimited power for the
amending body .... It is claimed that democracy can be replaced by any
other form of government which may be wholly undemocratic, the fed-
eral structure can be replaced by a unitary system . . . and the right of
judicial review can be completely taken away. 114
It is respectfully submitted that the respondents should have argued
that there were no legal limits to the power of constitutional amendment.
In fact, the respondents need not have conceded that short of total abro-
gation or repeal there was no limitation on the power of constitutional
amendment. Seervai has supported the above concession with legal argu-
111 See Tripathi, Kersavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, WhAo Wins?, 1 Sup. CT. CASES
1, 6 (1974), which suggests that these judges overruled Golak Nath by implication.
112 Most of the academic writings since Golak Nath have noted this point. See, e.g,,
H. M. SEERVAT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA 1099 (1967); P. B. GAJBNDRAGADKAR,
THE INDIAN PARLIAMENT AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (1972). S. P. SATHE, FUNDAMEN-
TAL RIGHTS AND AMENDMENT OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION (1968); H. CHAND, AMEIND.
ING PROCESS UNDER THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION (1972); and P. K. TRIPATHI, SOME IN-
SIGHTS INTO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, Lecture I, "Golak Nath: A Critique (1972).
11SKesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, [1973] 60 All India Rptt, 1461, 1490 (Sup.
114 Id. at 1566.
[Vol. 35
JUDICIAL REVIEW
ments in his recent article.1 5 But this very concession was used by the
majority justices to arrive at the conclusion that there were implied limita-
tions on Parliament's power of constitutional amendment. For example,
Mr. Justice Shelat concluded that "the amending body under Article 368
cannot have the same powers as a Constituent Assembly.""' 6  It is one
thing to say that Parliament has power to amend the constitution and quite
different to say that it can change democracy and set up a one-party rule.
In fact, there is a contradiction in the above statements. If there is Parlia-
ment, how can there be monarchy or one-party rule? As long as Parlia-
ment functions in its representative capacity, such questions need not arise.
Parliament, being a representative body, is bound to work subject to con-
straints which are built into the democratic process. Where such con-
straints break down, we wonder how long a court will be able to with-
stand the pressure of undemocratic forces.
These judges observed that the American case law on the question
of amendability was not relevant to India because according to the Con-
stitution of the United States an amendment cannot be made by Congress
alone. It is made by Congress and is required to be ratified by three-
fourths of the states either through their legislatures or through conven-
tions called for that purpose."' The Indian Constitution on the other
hand can be amended by Parliament alone. Chief Justice Sikri observed
that "if a proposal is made by the Congress and ratified by conventions
there cannot be any doubt that it is the people who have amended the
Constitution." Similarly, an amendment proposed by Congress and rati-
fied by the state legislatures could also be equated with the action of the
people. As against this, could it be said that an amendment of the Indian
Constitution was made by the people? 18 Mr. Justice Hedge went still
further. He said:
Two thirds of the members of the two Houses of Parliament need not
necessarily represent even the majority of the people of this country.
Our electoral system is such that even a minority of voters can elect more
than two thirds of the members of the either House of Parliament.119
Mr. Justice Reddy said that although the Constituent Assembly was not
elected on adult franchise, it was nonpartisan whereas Parliament was
115 Seervai, The Fundamental Rights Case at the Cross Roads, 75 BOMBAY L RPm 47
(1973).
I"Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, [1973] 60 All India Rptr. 1461, 1585 (Sup.
C.).
117 U.S. CONST., art- V.
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bound to be partial. -0 It is respectfully submitted that these justices chal-
lenged the basic assumptions underlying constitutional government. The
constitution which created the Supreme Court also created Parliament and
also the electoral system. The basic assumption of the constitution is
that Parliament represents the people.
From Mr. Justice Reddy's judgment we learn that even the attorney
general who represented the state's case fell prey to the argument regard-
ing the lack of representative character in Parliament. He argued that the
people had not been given part in the amending process because as they
were "illiterate and untutored they would not be able to take part in that
process with proper understanding or intelligence."'21  From this the
learned judge drew a conclusion that if sovereignty lay in the amending
provision, the people would never participate in constitution-making.12 "
It is submitted that the reason for not giving participation to the people is
not that they are illiterate. If that is the reason, then they are not fit for
democracy. The people have been given participation through their rep-
resentatives elected through adult franchise. In a country of India's size
it is unrealistic to talk of direct participation of the people in law making.
Mr. Justice Khanna replied to the above objection rightly when he said
that "the decision as to which method of amending the Constitution
should be chosen has necessarily to be that of the Constituent Assembly.'" '
Selection having been made it is not for a court to say that a particular
method is good or bad. He further said that the argument that the power
of amendment might be abused was "essentially an argument of fear and
distrust in the majority of representatives of the people.112 4 Mr. Justice
Khanna further said that the best safeguard against abuse of power was
public opinion. If under the sway of some overwhelming impulse a cli.
mate was created whereby those rights were abrogated, it was doubtful
how far a restricted interpretation of article 368 could help.1 25 He
pointed out that there were various provisions in the constitution which
could be abused. For example, during an emergency all fundamental
rights could be suspended. Parliament could also extend its life indef-
inately though only for a year at a time.128
Mr. Justice Khanna started with greater faith in the legislature. His
conclusion that the basic structure of the constitution could not be abro-
120 Id at 1738-39.
121 Id. at 1737.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 1853.
124 Id. at 1855.
125 Id. at 1857.
126 Id. at 1859.
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gated was based not on possible abuse of power or in the unrepresenta-
tive character of Parliament but on the premise that a constitution is in-
tended to be permanent. He too, like the other six judges, seems to have
decided to cry a halt to the further mutilation of the constitution as was
undertaken by article 31-C. Therefore he held that the basic structure
of the constitution could not be destroyed.
Six justices, Ray, Mathew, Beg, Dwivedi, Palekar and Chandrachud
held that there were no limitations on Parliament's power of constitu-
tianal amendment.
Mr. Justice Ray observed that "democracy proceeds on the faith and
capacity of the people to elect their representatives."121  Mr. Justice Ma-
thew observed that the assertion that the constitution was made by the
people was only "a rhetorical flourish.' 1128  He pointed out that "in no
country, except perhaps in a direct democracy, can the people en masse
be called legally sovereign." 129 He stressed that when Parliament amends
the constitution, it is "as much the guardian of the liberties of the people
as the courts.""'  Mr. Justice Dwivedi said "the Constitution does not rec-
ognise the supremacy of this Court over Parliament."' Mr. Justice
Chandrachud also urged the importance of trusting the elected represen-
tatives' 32
Thus we have a wide spectrum of opinions on the extent of the amen-
dability of the constitution. On the one end of the spectrum, we have
six judges, Chief Justice Sikri, and Justices Shelat, Hegde, Grover, Muk-
herjea and Reddy (we shall call them the Sikri group) holding the view
that there are implied limitations on Parliament's power of constitutional
amendment. According to these judges, the basic features of the consti-
tution cannot be abrogated. These judges used the terms "basic features"
and "basic structure" interchangeably.
According to Chief Justice Sikri, the following are the basic features:
(1) supremacy of the Constitution; (2) republican and democratic form
of government; (3) secular character of the constitution; (4) separation
of powers; (5) federal character and (6) dignity and freedom of the
individual. 3' Mr. Justice Shelat, in addition to the above six, also in-
cludes (7) the unity and integrity of the nation and (8) the mandate
12T7Id. at 1649.
28 Id. at 1922.
129M. at 1923.
130 Id. at 1938.
1lId, at 2008.
I32 ld. at 2042.
133 d. at 1535.
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given to the state in the directive principles of state policy.134 Mr. Justice
Hegde almost agrees with the above enumeration though differing in
detail slightly. He made it clear that these limitations were only "illustra-
tive."'135 Mr. Justice Reddy held the following to be the basic features of
the constitution: (1) sovereign and democratic republic; (2) social, eco-
nomic and political justice; (3) liberty of thought, expression, faith, be-
lief and worship; (4) equality of status and of opportunity. "To with-
draw any one of the above elements the structure will not survive and it
will not be the same Constitution." ' "What then are the essential fea-
tures or the basic elements comprising the structure of our Constitution
need not be considered in detail as these will fall for consideration in any
concrete case where they are said to have been abrogated and made non-
existent. ' 13 7 He however opined that fundamental rights were basic and
could not be abrogated by a constitutional amendment."3
Mr. Justice Khanna's position is different from the above six judges.
He gives a far greater latitude to Parliament when he says:
As a result of the amendment, the old constitution cannot be destroyed
and done away with .... What then is meant by the retention of the
old constitution? It means the retention of the basic structure or frame-
work of the old constitution.' 39
While elaborating this he says that it would not be permissible to abolish
the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha. According to him the right to
property does not pertain to the basic structure. :It is "a matter of de-
tail."' 4 0
Mr. Justice Khanna seems to be in agreement with the judges of the
Ray group in so far as his attitude towards Parliament is concerned. He
agrees that "no generation has monopoly of wisdom nor has any genera-
tion a right to place fetters on future generations to mould the ... laws
according to their requirements;' 41 that a peaceful method of constitu-
tional change is preferable to the violent method;"" that "the best safe-
guard against the abuse of power is public opinion;"' that if the people
"decide to have an entirely new constitution, they would not need the au-
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thority of the existing constitution." 1" However, he finds limitations in
the constitution itself on the power of constitutional amendment. It is
respectfully submitted that his position that the basic structure of the con-
stitution cannot be altered does not seem to go well with his position gen-
erally regarding the parliamentary process. He could have gone at the
most as far as up to what the state had conceded, that the power of con-
stitutional amendment did not include the power to repeal or abrogate
the entire constitution. But having rejected the doctrine of implied limi-
tations, the learned judge in effect found such limitations on the power of
Parliament. This he did most probably because he, like the other six
judges, dreaded the ghastly effects of article 31-C.14
As we move further right of Mr. Justice Khanna, we have three
judges, Beg, Mathew and Dwivedi, who doubted whether the power of
constitutional amendment extended to total repeal or abrogation of the
entire constitution at one stroke.148 However, they joined the other three
judges, Ray, Palekar and Chandrachud, in holding that there were no
limitations on Parliament's power of constitutional amendment.
Thus we have seven judges holding that there were limits to Parlia-
ment's power of constitutional amendment, and that such limits would be
enforced through judicial review. It is interesting that five of these seven
judges, namely, Sikri, Shelat, Grover, Hegde and Reddy, had voted to
strike down the bank nationalisation law. Further, four of them-Sikri,
Shelat, Hegde and Grover-had also struck down the government's order
de-recognising the princes. The other two judges, Mukherjea and
Khanna, of the Kesavananda majority had not participated in the above
decisions. Among the minority justices, only Mr. Justice Ray had voted
in favour of the law in Bank and in favour of the government's order in
the Privy Purse case.
C. Validity of the Impugned Amendments
The twenty-fourth amendment was upheld by all thirteen judges. Six
judges of the Sikri group and Mr. Justice Khanna held that the amend-
ment had not in any way altered the basic features or basic structure of
the constitution. However, since the original constitution itself limited
the power of constitutional amendment, that power in itself could not be
enlarged. The twenty-fourth amendment had not done so. The Sikri
group judges held that the fundamental rights were basic features. They
144Id. at 1861.
145 See Seervai, supra note 115, at 29.
148 Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, [1973] 60 All India Rptr. 1461, 1979, 1910,
1997 (Sup. Ct.).
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observed that what the twenty-fourth amendment did was to authorise
the amendment of fundamental rights to the extent of their abridgment
but not extending to their abrogation. It is submitted that mere abridg-
ment will not need a constitutional amendment since the constitution
contains provision for abridgment.
Regarding the twenty-fifth amendment, six judges of the Sikri group
and Mr. Justice Chandrachud of the Ray group held that despite the
word "amount," the Court had the power to examine whether the amount
was illusory or the principles for fixing the amount were irrelevant. 47
According to the judges of the Sikri group the twenty-fifth amendment
could be valid only if it was so interpreted.14 8  Mr. Justice Chandrachud
did not make the validity of the amendment contingent on such inter-
pretation, but according to him there was "intrinsic evidence in Article
31(2) that it does not empower the State to confiscate or expropriate
property." ' If the legislature wanted to do that it could have easily said
so in clear words.150
Five judges, Khanna, Ray, Mathew, Dwivedi and Beg, held that the
judicial review of compensation had been totally excluded by the twenty-
fifth amendment. Mr. Justice Palekar observed that "one cannot antici-
pate any such matters and strike down an amendment which, in all con-
science, does not preclude a fair amount being fixed." '' It is submitted
that since the judge had voted in favour of the unlimited power of con-
stitutional amendment, a question regarding the validity of the amend-
ment could not arise.
Article 31-C consisted of two parts. The first part conferred immun-
ity on the laws enacted for the purpose of preventing the concentration of
wealth and the use of the means of production to the common detriment,
and promoting the distribution of ownership and control of the material
resources so as to best subserve the common good, against attack on the
ground of their inconsistency with the fundamental rights of equality,
personal freedoms, and right to property. The second part made the leg-
147 Mr. Chief Justice Sikri wondered what meaning could be given to the world "amount."
The word "amount" meant "something to be given in lieu of the property to be acquired but
this amount has to and can be worked out by laying down certain principles. These principles
must then have a reasonable relationship to the property which is sought to be acquired. If
this is so, the amount ultimately arrived at by applying the principles must have some reason-
able relationship with the property to be acquired." 1d. at 1554.
148 Id. "If I were to interpret Art. 31(2) as meaning that even an arbitrary of illusory or
grossly low amount could be given.... a serious question would arise whether Parliament has






islature's declaration, that a law gave effect to the directive principles,
conclusive. 152
Chief Justice Sikri and Justices Shelat, Hegde, Grover and Mukherjea
held the entire article invalid. That article abrogated the fundamental
rights and by giving the power to the state legislatures to pass laws incon-
sistent with the fundamental rights, in effect, delegated the power of con-
stitutional amendment to the state legislatures. It was therefore void.
Mr. Justice Reddy held the first part of the article valid if the words "in-
consistent with or takes away" used in respect of the fundamental rights
and the words "article 14" were omitted. In his opinion the above ele-
ments constituted the transgression of the limits of the amending power
of Parliament.153 Since this objectionable part could be separated from
the rest of the article, the remaining portion was valid. However the sec-
ond part was invalid.'- Mr. Justice Khanna held only the second part
of that article invalid.'55 The majority decision therefore was that only
the second part of artide 31-C was invalid.
The dissenting justices of the Ray group upheld the entire article. This
was in keeping with their view that Parliament's power of constitutional
amendment was unlimited. These justices however held that, despite the
finality clause contained in the second part of the article, the courts had
the power to examine whether a law was relevant to the implementation
of the directive principles. These justices drew a distinction between the
nexus between a law and the directive principles and the necessity of the
law for the implementation or the fact of implementation of the direc-
tive principles. While the former could be examined, the latter, in view
of the finality clause, could not be examined. These justices used the tra-
ditional method which courts often use against finality clauses in order to
keep their power intact.
CONCLUSION
The above account suggests that both the Supreme Court and Parlia-
ment claimed supremacy vis-a-vis each other. Golak Nath amply illus-
trated that the Court cannot establish its supremacy through legal logic
alone. In Kesavananda the Court has once again attempted to do the
same. Both Parliament and the Supreme Court debated with great zeal
the question of the sovereignty of the people. -Plarliament claimed that
it alone spoke on behalf of the people. The Supreme Court on the other
1 52 See Appendix, infra, at 898.
15 3 Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, [1973] 60 All India Rpm. 1461, 1773 (Sup.
Ct).
1a Id.
253 Id. at 1902.
1974]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
hand questioned this premise. It is submitted that all talk of sovereignty
of the people in the Indian situation tends to be highly academic and only
emotive. In fact this could be said even about many advanced nations
and therefore could be said with much greater force about India, where
the majority of the people are still illiterate, poor, and tend to accept the
inherited lot. Parliament as well as the Supreme Court are elitist institu-
tions which are engaged in bringing about modernisation, economic and
social justice and consciousness of liberty to the Indian people. Both
can work towards these ideals. But in the writer's opinion, their fields
are different. The Supreme Court need not be a contender for the con-
stituent power. Supreme Court decisions can acquire only functional
finality. While Parliament responds to popular demands, the Court pro-
tects the political minorities and educates the public by making vocal and
audible the enduring values which are the basis of a free society. Whereas
Parliament requires a two-thirds majority to amend the constitution, a
'judicial decision will become final if it generates the support of that sig-
nificant minority of Parliament's membership which can successfully re-
sist constitutional amendment. The debates in Parliament show that
there was a strong minority opinion in favour of excluding certain fun-
damental rights from the process of constitutional amendment. The
Court must try to cultivate the support of such a minority for its decisions.
This will depend upon the social legitimacy of the judicial decisions.
If the Court holds that in the absence of legal aid equal protection
of law is meaningless, the government will be forced to take steps for
providing legal aid to the poor. If instead of doing so it tries to amend
the constitution, its socialistic pretensions would stand exposed. Similarly,
the Court can lend greater protection to personal freedoms such as free-
dom of speech or freedom of association. These decisions of the Court
are bound to acquire functional finality in view of their importance.
They would also strengthen the democratic process. Unfortunately the
Indian Supreme Court has not been liberal enough in respect of these
freedoms. We can give only two instances to support this view. Mr.
Namboodripad, a communist leader, was convicted for contempt of court
for having made statements about the judicial system which were purely
innocuous. The Supreme Court, which upheld this conviction, did not
appreciate that what was sacrificed was freedom of speech and that the
law of contempt of court needed to be interpreted in such a way as to be
compatible with this freedom.' Similarly, the Supreme Court of India
upheld a ban on the sale of D. H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover
156E. M. S. Namboodripad v. T. N. Nambiar, [1970] 57 All India Rptr. 2015 (Sup.
Ct.). See this author's comments in 5 ECON. & POL. WEEKLY 1741-42 (October 17, 1970).
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under the law of obscenity.1 57 It is submitted that the Court was too
much of a strict constructionist in so far as these rights are concerned.
It is only on the right to property that the Court gave libertarian inter-
pretations. But in view of the low priority of this right in the Indian scale
of values the Court decisions came under heavy fire. Libertarian stands
of the Court on other fundamental rights will not only gain a finality for
the Court's decisions, but also will act as a restraint on democracy and ul-
timately compel those in authority to implement the directive principles of
state policy with greater sincerity. The Court and Parliament will then
compete and co-operate in making democracy more meaningful to the
multitude.
In the end we can say that the conflict between Parliament and the
Supreme Court appears to be mainly institutional. Their conflicting posi-
tions on right to property may appear to have contradictory ideological
stances. But neither is Parliament committed to the abolition of private
property, nor is the Supreme Court bent upon forestalling the social and
economic change which the constitution visualises. The institutional con-
flict is often explained away in ideological idiom. The Court could show
greater deference to the will of the legislature in matters of private prop-
erty and Parliament could show greater patience with judicial review.
There is nothing unusual in such an institutional conflict; it often arises
in a democratic government where the power of decision-making is
divided. However, it must be contained within limits so that it can be
utilized as an effective check on both institutions, but does not subject





(1) No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.
(2) [Originally enacted] No property, movable or immovable, including
any interest in, or in any company, owning any commercial or industrial under-
taking, shall be taken possession of or acquired for public purposes under any law
authorising the taking of such possession or such acquisition, unless the law pro-
vides for compensation for the property taken possession of or acquired and either
157 See Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Marashtra, [1965] 52 All India Rptr. 881 (Sup. CL).
Similarly on prior censorship of films, see K. A. Abbas v. Union of India, [1971] 58 All India
Rp:r. 481 (Sup. C), noted in Sathe, 7 ANNUAL SURVY OF INDiAN LAW 120 (1971). Oa
obscenity, see K. M. Sharma, Obscenity and the Law, THE ROOTS OF OBSCENITY 41 (1967);
and Rao, Obscenity, Literature, and the Law, THE ROOTS OF OBScENrr" 66 (1967).
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fixes the amount of the compensation, or specifies the principles on which, and
the manner in which, the compensation is to be determined and given,
(2) [As amended by the fourth amendment] No property shall be com-
pulsorily acquired or requisitioned save for a public purpose and save by authority
of a law which provides for compensation for the property so acquired or requisi-
tioned and either fixes the amount of the compensation or specifies the principles
on which, and the manner in which, the compensation is to be determined and
given; and no such law shall be called in question in any court on the ground that
the compensation provided by that law is not adequate.
(2) [As amended by the twenty-fifth amendment] No property shall be
compulsorily acquired or requisitioned save for a public purpose and save by
authority of a law which provides for acquisition or requisitioning of the prop-
erty for an amount which may be fixed by such law or which may be determined
in accordance with such principles and given in such manner as may be specified
in such law; and no such law shall be called in question in any court on the ground
that the amount so fixed or determined is not adequate or that the whole or any
part of such amount is to be given otherwise than in cash:
Provided that in making any law providing for the compulsory acquisition of
any property of an educational institution established and administered by a mi-
nority, referred to in clause (1) of article 30, the State shall ensure that the amount
fixed by or determined under such law for the acquisition of such property is
such as would not restrict or abrogate the right guaranteed under that clause.
(2A) Where a law does not provide for the transfer of the ownership or
right to possession of any property to the State or to a corporation owned or con-
trolled by the State, it shall not be deemed to provide for the compulsory acquisi-
tion or requisitioning of property, notwithstanding that it deprives any person of
his property.
(2B) Nothing in sub-clause (f) of clause (1) of article 19 shall affect any
such law as is referred to in clause (2).
(3) No such law as is referred to in clause (2) made by the Legislature of
a State shall have effect unless such law, having been reserved for the considera-
tion of the President, has received his assent.
(4) If any Bill pending at the commencement of this Constitution in the
Legislature of a State has, after it has been passed by such Legislature, been re-
served for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, then,
notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, the law so assented to shall not be
called in question in any court on the ground that it contravenes the provisions
of dause (2).
(5) Nothing in clause (2) shall affect-
(a) the provisions of any existing law other than a law to which the pro-
visions of clause (6) apply, or
(b) the provisions of any law which the State may hereafter make-
(i) for the purpose of imposing or levying any tax or penalty, or
(ii) for the promotion of public health or the prevention of danger to
life or property, or
(iii) in pursuance of any agreement entered into between the Govern-
ment of the Dominion of India or the Government of India and the Gov-
eminent of any other country, or otherwise, with respect to property declared
by law to be evacuee property.
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(6) Any law of the State enacted not more than eighteen months before the
commencement of this Constitution may within three months from such commence-
ment be submitted to the President for his certification; and thereupon, if the
President by public notification so certifies, it shall not be called in question in any
court on the ground that it contravenes the provisions of clause (2) of this article
or has contravened the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 299 of the Govern-
ment of India Act, 1935.
Article 31-A. Saving of lawrs providing for acquisition of estates, etc.-(1) Not-
withstanding anything contained in article 13, no law providing for-
(a) the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or
the extinguishment or modification of any such rights, or
(b) the taking over of the management of any property by the State for a
limited period either in the public interest or in order to secure the proper
management of the property, or
(c) the amalgamation of two or more corporations either in the public
interest or in order to secure the proper management of any of the corpora-
tions, or
(d) the extinguishment or modification of any rights of managing agents,
secretaries and treasurers, managing directors, directors or managers of corpo-
rations, or of any voting rights of shareholders thereof, or
(e) the extinguishment or modification of any rights accruing by virtue of
any agreement, lease or licence for the purpose of searching for, or winning,
any mineral or mineral oil, or the premature termination or cancellation of
any such agreement, lease or licence,
shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away
or abridges any of the rights conferred by article 14, article 19 or article 31:
Provided that where such law is a law made by the Legislature of a State, the
provisions of this article shall not apply thereto unless such law, having been re-
served for the consideration of the President, has received his assent.
Provided further that where any law makes any provision for the acquisition
by the State of any estate and where any land comprised therein is held by a per-
son under his personal cultivation, it shall not be lawful for the State to acquire
any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any
law for the time being in force or any building or structure standing thereon or
appurtenant thereto, unless the law relating to the acquisition of such land,
building or structure, provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall
not be less than the market value thereof.
(2) In this article,--
(a) the expression "estate" shall, in relation to any local area, have the
same meaning as that expression or its local equivalent has in the existing law
relating to land tenures in force in that area and shall also include-
(i) any jagir, inam or muafi or other similar grant and in the States of
Tamil Nadu and Kerala, A janmam right;
(ii) any land held under ryotwari settlement;
(iii) any land held or let for purposes of agriculture or for purposes
ancillary thereto, including waste land, forest land, land for pasture or sites
of buildings and other structures occupied by cultivators of land, agricultural
labourers and village artisans;
(b) the expression "rights" in relation to an estate, shall include any
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rights vesting in a proprietor, sub-proprietor, under-proprietor, tenure-holder,
raiyat, under-rai),at or other intermediary and any rights or privileges in respect
of land revenue.
Article 31-B. Validation of certain Acts and Regulations.-Without prejudice to
the generality of the provisions contained in article 31 A, none of the Acts and
Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule nor any of the provisions thereof
shall be deemed to be void, or ever to have become void, on the ground that such
Act, Regulation or provision is inconsistent with, takes away or abridges any of the
rights conferred by, any provisions of this Part, and notwithstanding any judg-
ment, decree or order of any court or tribunal to the contrary, each of the said
Acts and Regulations shall, subject to the power of any competent Legislature to
repeal or amend it, continue in force.
Article 31-C. Saving of laws giving effect to certain directive principles.-Not-
withstanding anything contained in article 13, no law giving effect to the policy
of the State towards securing the principles specified in clause (b) or clause (c)
of article 39 shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent
with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by article 14, article
19 or article 31; and no law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect
to such policy shall be called in question in any court on the ground that it does
not give effect to such policy;
Provided that where such law is made by the Legislature of a State, the provi-
sions of this article shall not apply thereto unless such law, having been reserved
for the consideration of the President, has received his assent.
Article 39. Certain principles of policy to be followed by the State.-The State
shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing-
(b) that the ownership and control of the material resources of the com-
munity are so distributed as best to subserve the common good;
(c) that the operation of the economic system does not result in the con-
centration of wealth and means of production to the: common detriment;
B. Amendment of the Constittiion
Article 368
[As Originally enacted]. Procedure for amendment of the Constlittion.-An
amendment of this Constitution may be initiated only by the introduction of a Bill
for-the purpose in either House of Parliament, and when the Bill is passed in
each House by a majority of the total membership of that House and by a major-
ity of not less than two-thirds of the members of that House present and voting,
it shall be presented to the President for his assent and upon such assent being
given to the Bill, the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the
terms of the Bill:
Provided that if such amendment seeks to make any change in-
(a) article 54, article 55, article 73, article 162 or article 241, or
(b) Chapter IV of Part V, Chapter V of Part VI, or Chapter I of Part
XI, or
(c) any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule, or
(d) the representation of States in Parliament, or
(e) the provisions of this article,
the amendment shall also require to be ratified by the Legislatures of not less than
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one-half of the States by resolutions to that effect passed by those Legislatures be-
fore the Bill making provision for such amendment is presented to the President
for assent.
[Amended by the twenty-fourth amendment] Power of Parliament to amend the
Constitution and procedure therefor.--(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Con-
stitution, Parliament may in exercise of its constituent power amend by way of ad.
dition, variation or repeal any provision of this Constitution in accordance with
the procedure laid down in this article.
(2) An amendment of this Constitution may be initiated only by the intro-
duction of a Bill for the purpose in either House of Parliament, and when the
Bill is passed in each House by a majority of the total membership of that House
and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that House
present and voting, it shall be presented to the President who shall give his assent
to the Bill and thereupon the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance
with the terms of the Bill:
Provided that if such amendment seeks to make any change in-
(a) article 54, article 55, article 73, article 162 or article 241, or
(b) Chapter IV of Part V, Chapter V of Part VI, or Chapter I of Part
XI, or
(c) any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule, or
(d) the representation of States in Parliament, or
(e) the provisions of this article,
the amendment shall also require to be ratified by the Legislatures of not less than
one-half of the States by resolutions to that effect passed by those Legislatures
before the Bill making provision for such amendment is presented to the President
for assent.
(3) Nothing in article 13 shall apply to any amendment made under this
article.
